An assessment of agency theory in the context of higher education institutions by Ahmad, Abd Rahman et al.
ICTMBE 2013                                                                                     
2nd International Conference on Technology Management , Business and Entrepreneurship                                        
Mahkota Hotel Melaka Malaysia                                                                                                                        
5th December 2013 
ISSBN 978-967-0468-56-3 
2013 
 
258 
An Assessment of Agency Theory in the Context of Higher 
Education Institutions 
Abd Rahman Ahmad 1*, Mohd Nazir Mohd Adi, Haris Md Noor, Ng Kim Soon & 
Anim Zalina Azizan 
Faculty of Technology Management, Business and Entrepreneurship, 
Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia, 86400 Parit Raja Batu Pahat,Johor , Malaysia 
+6074533952 
arahman@uthm.edu.my 
 
Abstract 
 
The rationale of this concept paper is to describe the application of Agency Theory in higher 
education institutions. The theory focused on the relationship between the principal and 
agent. Within the relationship, the most important problems that arise are informational 
asymmetries and goal conflicts. This is due to the incomplete information and different 
behaviour in the actions by the agents. Agency Theory needs to be further explore and testing 
to create valuable tool for research study especially in the context of higher education 
institutions. Within this perspective, research and the structure of this theory is applicable as a 
conceptual framework for the study related to the relationship between government and 
public funded universities.    
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Introduction 
 
In the context of modern higher education today, the government has made dramatic changes 
to institutions size, structure, funding arrangements, and focus in order to address public 
concern and compete in the global market. It encompasses the relationship with the intention 
of creation, acquisition, sharing, and transmission of knowledge to underpin effective 
teaching and learning, and research and development for the benefits of stakeholder. In 
support to those activities, the government has granted institutional with funding from the 
taxpayer money. The notion that the agents have to be more accountable to produce a certain 
level of public output and make information available to the public (Leruth & Paul, 2006) to 
fulfill its mission in line with the government objectives and strategic planning (Lane & 
Kivistö, 2008). Nevertheless, for Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) autonomy, 
accountability, governance, market pressure, and lack of funds becomes pressures for them in 
performing the principal strategic plan. In response to these competitive pressures, 
institutions should focus on the development of performance measurement system that is 
consistent with the government objectives. The ultimate aims of implementing these methods 
are to provide standard measurement for the institutions. However, conflicts arise when agent 
and principal have different objectives and therefore it is difficult for the principal to monitor 
the report and actions need to be taken by agents (Lane & Kivistö, 2008; Milgrom & Roberts, 
1992). As a result, the effectiveness and efficiency used of resources and funds to the activity 
performed by agent is inconsistent with the desired outcomes that should in delivering their 
educational services. Therefore, Agency Theory provided a framework as an alternative way 
of assessing the relationship between principal and agent with the intention to reduce the 
agency problem (Kivistö, 2005, 2008). 
 
Agency Theory 
 
Strehl et al., (2007) have highlighted the important key features of theoretical framework and 
concept that are appropriate to describe, analyse, and explain on effect of the changes 
government funding to the HEIs. Indeed, they have come out with seven components of 
theories that are applicable in this context of the study: 
 
• New Public Management; 
• Governance; 
• New Institutional Economics; 
• Strategy;  
• Marketing;  
• Resource Allocation Mechanisms; and  
• Organisation Behaviour. 
 
This paper discusses into the perspective of New Institutional Economics or Economic 
Institutional Analysis, which underlines three main concepts, called: (1) Principal-Agent 
Theory; (2) Theory of Property Rights; and (3) Theory of Transaction Costs. At its most 
basic, this theory attempts to analyse the institutions  social, economic, and political 
phenomena (Furubotn & Richter, 2005; Ménard, 2008; Menard & Shirley, 2005). 
Nevertheless, the intention of this research is on the application of Agency Theory as the 
primary object to analyse the relationship between the principal and the agent. According to 
ICTMBE 2013                                                                                     
2nd International Conference on Technology Management , Business and Entrepreneurship                                        
Mahkota Hotel Melaka Malaysia                                                                                                                        
5th December 2013 
ISSBN 978-967-0468-56-3 
2013 
 
260 
Klein (1998) this theory often applies in various fields ranging from economics, law, 
organisation theory, political, sociology, and anthropology. Meanwhile, in the context of 
HEIs, this theory can be applied to study the relationship between government and 
institutions and has significant contribution to the body of literature (Hodgson, 1998; Menard, 
2001). In agreement with that, Auranen and Nieminen (2010)  argued that the main 
justification for the shift of public policies to the output/outcome alignment and the use of 
performance funding mechanisms relates to the Principal-Agent Theory dilemma and the 
concepts of New Public Management.  
 
The originality of Principal Agent Theory (PAT) or Agency Theory applied in the fields of 
economics (Coase, 1998; Williamson, 1985) to assess the difficulties associated with 
approach between principal and agents to accomplish a specific task (Rauchhaus, 2009). In 
accordance to that, Kivistö (2005) point out that this theory is not and has never been 
exclusive property of any fields. Jensen and Meckling (1976)defined an Agency Theory as: 
 
“A contract under which one or more persons (the principal) engage another person 
(agent) to perform some service on behalf which involves delegating some decision-making 
authority to the agent” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I: Agency Theory Relationship 
 
The classic example of Agency Theory applied in the interaction between patient and doctor, 
defendant and lawyer, landlord and tenant, and employer and employee. With that, the agency 
relationship derived from the contractual agreement between principal and agents in the 
expectation that the agents will take actions to produce outcomes (see Figure 1) as expected 
by the principal (Moe, 1984; Waterman & Meier, 1998). Furthermore, the basic reason of 
agency relationship is because of the agent possess skills, information, qualification, 
experience and abilities to perform specific task to undertake that will more likely lead to 
good outcomes for the principal (Bendor et al., 2001; Kivistö & Hölttä, 2008). He added that, 
the relationship context can be arranged from single-principal-single-agent to multiple-
principal-single-agent or single-principal-multiple-agent which is turn out to be more 
complex. However, in performing the relationship the basic features of agent problem take 
place because of: (1) the principal knows less than the agent does; and (2) conflict of goals in 
delegation of the task in view of the fact that the principal cannot observe the action taken by 
the agents. 
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Assumptions Under Agency Theory 
  
The main assumption and perspective of Agency Theory focuses on goal conflicts and 
informational asymmetries: 
 
i. Goal conflicts 
 As a situation where the principals and agent’s desires and interests concerning certain 
 ends are in conflict with each other and that, they would therefore prefer different 
 course of action. 
 
ii. Informational asymmetries 
 Agent possesses more or better information about the details of individual task 
 assigned to him, his own action, abilities, and preferences compared to principal. 
 
Indeed, Agency theory is also based on several other behavioural assumptions concerning the 
principal, the agent and the agency relationship (Kivistö, 2007). These are summarised in the 
table below.  
 
Table 1: Summary of Assumptions Underlying Agency Theory 
 
Assumption Explanation 
Self-interested actors · The individual is a rational, self-interested actor who 
 only wants to maximise their own preferences 
 (Judith, 2002). 
Utlility maximisers · Both economics and political science PAT consider 
 the principal and the agent as self-interested utility 
 maximisers (Lane & Kivistö, 2008) 
· This assumption is important for a mathematical 
 approach that oriented the principal–agent 
 researchers that are based on logic and proof 
 (Kivistö, 2007; Rungfamai, 2008) 
Risk preferences 
 
· Degree of an actor’s preference for adventure over 
 security (Kivistö, 2007) 
· Risk preferences are part of the self-interest aspect 
 (Fama & Jenson, 1983) 
· Occurs in situations where the principal and agent 
 have different attitudes to the risk associated with 
the  action taken (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998) 
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Assumption Explanation 
Types  · One of the most important and generally accepted 
 assumption is that the agents differ according to 
their  types (Kivistö, 2007) 
· Kivisto further explain that the types could be refer 
to  whether the agent is ‘careful versus careless’, 
 ‘trustworth versus untrustworth’, and ‘industrious 
 versus untalented’ 
Bounded rationality 
 
· Is an effect of the constraints of incomplete 
 information between the principal and agent to solve 
 the problem (Michael, 1994) 
· Positive agency theory literature shares this 
assumption  with transaction cost theory (Kivistö, 2007) 
Rational actors 
 
· A rational actor is one who can identify what he or 
she  wants, is capable of ordering those wants from most 
 preferred to least preferred, and acts in ways that he 
or  she believes will maximise satisfaction of 
preferences  (Albanese et al., 1997) 
 
 
Agency Theory In Higher Education 
 Informational asymmetries 
Informational asymmetries concern on interaction between principal and agent in performing 
specific task. In practice, this problem could not be avoided because most often agent has 
access to superior information about the details of delegated tasks compared to principal. As 
the consequences, the principal not have the full access of information and these 
characteristics of problem become an opportunity for the agent to gain by keeping certain 
information inaccessible to the principal. As a result, information may not be distributed 
equally between principal and agent due to conflicting of interest about something important 
known only to the agents. This may cause the circumstances where the agents is cheating, 
given inadequate information, and bounded rationality in general (Perrow, 1993).  
 
The previous research have demonstrated that informational asymmetries exist in the 
operation of HEIs (Jongbloed, 2006; Kivistö & Hölttä, 2008) and it is relevant in the study of 
higher education system (Liefner, 2003; Smart, 2001). In relation to that Liefner(2003) 
research study focus more on resource allocation in HEIs in the context of the universities 
performances. In practice, HEIs will impose their skills, information, qualifications, 
experiences and abilities to provide education services available to public. However, 
Liefner(2003) and Kivistö and Hölttä(2008) argued that in reality it is hard for the principal 
to observe the quality of T&L, and R&D outcomes produced by the HEIs. This is due to the 
limited understanding of how organisations operate (Lambert, 2001) and this factor lead to 
the information asymmetries because the principal is difficult to monitor the agents 
competencies and actions in the real environment (Saam, 2007). 
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In particular, the central argument from Kivistö and Hölttä in the context of higher education 
raising because stakeholders indicated strong interest in  information and reporting in order to 
monitor organisations activities and performance. These include information on of the quality 
of higher education, academic, and research performance. Lane and Kivistö(2008) pointed 
out that the purposed of monitoring behaviour is to decrease the information asymmetry. In 
relation to Kivistö and Hölttä first criteria, initally prospective students and parents receive 
information from market signal to make decision and the transactions are not always 
complete in immediate process. In that sense, the educational system was nominally 
responsive from the market behaviour and during this time lag, there might be delay in 
transactions, coordination, and decision making from customers. In most cases, the problem 
occurs when there is information mismatch between institutions and students.  Kivistö and 
Hölttä explained  the reason to the problem is because of there is lag between the time of 
purchase (enrolment behaviour, resource allocation) and the consumption (learning 
experiences, rate of return to higher education). Therefore, the only way to resolve this 
problem is by forcing institutions to make the information available in order to strengthen 
their relationship with stakeholders and finally reduced the informational asymmetries. 
 
The second criteria refer to different types of buyers and consumers entities that purchase 
goods and services in market. With many goods and services available, consumers have to 
make decision before making any purchasing for their own satisfaction. In general, HEIs 
provided services to the customers to enhance local human capital development as one of the 
important pillars. As perceived, direct return of higher education is normally associated with 
greater contribution to economic opportunities. However, in the perspective of informational 
asymmetries, Kivistö and Hölttä explain that the significant question arise either customers 
have more or less the same understanding on their needs and preferences regarding higher 
education. Despite the fact that, the system of higher education acquire funding from the 
government. However, in practice the principal do not have the access of institutional actual 
performance. To reduce the probelm institution should focus on the actual performance in 
order to be more accountable to public. They should provide real time information available 
to customers in order for them to make a right decision. 
 
Finally, higher education produces a complex mix of public goods that might vary in time and 
it is difficult for the customers to describe the difference.  In addition, Kivistö and Hölttä 
argued that academic work (teaching and research) surrounded by high informational 
asymmetries starting from its core substance, knowledge. This is because to meet perceived 
market needs, academic systems are by now highly differentiated in most countries (Altbach, 
2007). There seems to be the increasing practical importance for the effectiveness of the 
higher education and research system in order to reduce this problem. With rapid increase in 
the numbers and variety of institutions today, it is crucial to define the nature and scope of 
their services to the public. Thus, to understand the marketplace and different customer 
segments, institutions should balance the information available for meeting their 
expectations.  
 
Kivistö and Hölttä(2008) argued that another factor contributed to information asymmetries 
is the complexities in the production of universities. Here, universities performance on 
teaching and research are the main core functions to meet social goals. As describe, HEIs 
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produces a complex mix of pubic goods from different types of input for teaching and 
research. This process might differ according to time spent on different function, technology, 
method and facilities that the universities have. In agreement with Gautier and Wauthy(2007), 
it is hard to see what happens exactly to evaluate the quality of teaching and research even 
evidences from suggest that university perform in research also perform well in teaching. For 
this reason,  Kivistö & Hölttä(2008) have pointed out that in practical it is difficult to 
stakeholders to know the true difference between the allocated funding and the actual 
minimum costs of delivering the desired level of teaching and research output in universities. 
 
Jacobs and Van Der Ploeg(2006) argued that information asymmetries instigated problems in 
funding systems, governance, selection of students, appointment of academic staff, and the 
regulation. Due to information problems, as usual, government intervention is warranted 
whenever market failure are present (Bebczuk, 2002). In the meantime, several public 
institutions incorporate capitalist element in their day-to-day operation as important ways to 
generate funding (Bleiklie & Kogan, 2007). But by nature, the government at most time are 
unable to monitor and control the behaviour of universities (Schiller & Liefner, 2006). 
However, to address these issues the principal can influence the effort level of institutions by 
providing incentives and monitoring system. 
 
Goal conflicts 
Agency Theory deals with goal conflicts that may arise during the delegation of authority 
from principal to agent.  In order to achieve the principal desired outcome, this hidden action 
caused different attitudes towards risk on the relationship between principal and agent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). The agency problems arise when the principal and agent have different 
risk preferences and conflicting goals. This typical problem leads them to prefer different 
courses of action (Bergan et al., 2009) because universities are large and complex 
organisation(Enders & Fulton, 2002; Rowley et al., 1997; Soguel & Jaccard, 2008) with 
different vision, mission and goals (Kivistö, 2007; Massy, 1996) and institutions sometimes 
can be classified according to their  programme, knowledge, and the modes of delivery.  
 
Yet, Thorley (1995) argued that HEIs mission is complex by a tradition of academic freedom 
in which individual academics develop autonomously and management style tends towards 
administrative rather than proactive leadership. In the meantime, universities would like to 
achieve as many different goals to move the organisation toward its vision and mission. They 
are increasingly turning to align education activities to institutional strategy, and to monitor 
performance toward strategic goals over time. The direction towards that is because goals and 
objectives move the organisation in the direction of its purpose and mission in short term 
(Tischler et al., 1993). However, because of the agents may not share the goals and task 
(Lassar & Kerr, 1996) in most situation contracting problems are difficultdue to goal conflict, 
measurability, and observability (Van Slyke, 2007).  
 
The central purpose of goals is to provide direction to the agents towards specific outcomes 
that must be achieved especially during the limited financial resources and demands for 
accountability where HEIs need to clearly clarify their purpose or goals more closely 
(McKelvie, 1986). Following this, two types of goals are: (1) official; and (2) operative. An 
official goal refers to general purpose of organisation that stated the organisation is trying to 
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achieve. Meanwhile, an operative goal is a specific actual day-to-day operating policy of the 
organisation. These goals provide specific measures of achievement that the organisation 
actually seeks to attain through its operating policies and activities (Perrow, 1961). Conrad 
(1974) characterised the operative goals in university as a function of constraints in 
establishes the direction and ongoing activities in the institutions. Here, the summarisation of 
these major constraints on university includes: (1) institutional beliefs; (2) state government 
and boards of trustees; (3) federal government; (4) competing organisations; (5) university 
clients; (6) publics; (7) student clients; and (8) technology. Models from Conrad explain the 
constraints of university operative goals depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 0: Constraints of University Operative Goals 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Conrad (1974) 
 
 
 
 
 
In general, university operative goals constraints exist due to several factors, which are forces 
from internal and external environment, control and authority in the university, university 
does not have control over resource allocation, academic program, and courses and individual 
or groups apply different choices of criteria in determining the university importance policy. 
These interaction and engagement in various ways contributed to the internal and external 
constraints to the university responsiveness on the needs of stakeholders as described in 
figure above. Here, the institutional belief is one of the basic parameters for university 
operative goals. Meanwhile, constraints over university operative goals in relation with state 
government and federal government exist because of most funding resources come from 
government for university. Furthermore, this external constraints act as the regulative body 
that give mandate for the institutions. They often set rules and guidelines directed to the 
institutions performance and contributed to a cohesive effect on the universities operative 
goals. There are number of major constraints of university operative goals explained by 
Conrad. These include competing organisation, university clients, student clients, and 
technology. It is likely that, these constraints may have an impact on the supporting university 
strategic goals and this conflicts is likely to have negative effects to the overall organisation 
performance (Rizzo et al., 1970). 
 
Meanwhile, Kivistö (2005) clarified that the assumption of goal conflict on both sides 
(government and HEIs) can be seen as realistic. Here he described the relationship as ‘the 
long but still ongoing “love hate-relationship” bounding governments and HEIs together is 
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complex and it has multiple dimensions’. In this conditions, the approach to define a contract 
based on outcome can be viewed as mechanisme to control the agent behaviour in order to 
minimise to goals conflict. In addition to contractual agreements between principal and 
agents, Kivistö suggested that when there is strong differences on goals, outcome based 
contracts could be used in controling agent behaviour with the aims to ensure future growth 
and sustainable development of higher education to the nation. Indeed, government control 
through performance monitoring can become important mechanism at the university level. 
Under the performance based mechanism, funding level promotes better alignment of 
university goals and GOs. However, to get the benefit of it implementation, university must 
first have autonomy and financial freedom. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Agency Theory needs to be further explore and testing to create valuable tool for research 
study especially in the context of higher education institutions. Agency Theory offer unique 
explanations arising from the government and agents’ relationship since that the principal is 
unable to monitor the agent activities perfectly and one party lack of information. In addition, 
agency problem arise due to goals conflict and information asymmetry. 
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